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To many geneticists, general cognitive ability (g), usually called
“intelligence” or “IQ,” might seem to be a most unlikely trait
to take seriously. More than any other trait, it is associated
with controversy, both scientific and political, which was seen
most recently after the publication of The Bell Curve (Herrn-
stein and Murray 1994). How can something as nebulous as
g be measured? How can it possibly be useful in genetic anal-
yses?
Books such as this by Nicholas Mackintosh will aid the sci-
entific rehabilitation of g (also see Brody 1992; Seligman 1992;
Sternberg and Grigorenko 1997; Jensen 1998). Mackintosh is
Chair of the Department of Experimental Psychology at Cam-
bridge University and is a distinguished animal-learning the-
orist. That he comes to examine the field of intelligence as an
outsider with no ax to grind will increase the book’s impact
for a wide audience, with his endorsement of the importance
of g and the genetics that underlies it. Mackintosh’s book is
a good introduction to this field, in its description of the ev-
idence for g’s validity, reliability, stability, and heritability. The
book also includes a good summary of what we know (and,
mostly, do not know) about environmental effects on g; it
tackles the fraught issue of group differences and is especially
helpful in its attempt to bring together g and cognitive psy-
chology, two fields of mental functioning that have kept their
distance. Because the book provides a broad overview of these
areas, it does not discuss all issues related to genetics (see
below), nor does it address neuroscience research on learning
and memory, as seen in synaptic plasticity such as long-term
potentiation, an area in which rapid progress is being made
in genetic analysis (Migaud et al. 1998).
Measures of cognitive abilities as diverse as spatial ability
(Mervis et al. 1999 [in this issue]), verbal ability, and memory
intercorrelate moderately, with correlation coefficients of ∼.50.
However, it is not known what lies at the core of this general
cognitive ability, whether it is a general process, such as ex-
ecutive function or a speedy brain, or whether it derives from
overlapping component processes. Mackintosh favors the lat-
ter view. Regarding genetic research, Mackintosh agrees with
other reviews in concluding that g is substantially heritable.
More quantitative genetic research is available for g than for
any other dimension or disorder—not just for behavior but
for any domain of the life sciences. Dozens of studies, including
18,000 parent-offspring pairs, 125,000 pairs of siblings,
110,000 twin pairs, and 100s of adoptive families, all converge
on the conclusion that the heritability of g is ∼50% (Bouchard
and McGue 1981). Sorting the results by age suggests that
heritability increases from ∼20% in infancy to ∼40% in child-
hood, to 60% later in life (McGue et al. 1993), even for
individuals 80 years of age (McClearn et al. 1997). Nearly
all of the genetic variance is additive—that is, genetic effects
add up rather than interact across loci and, thus, “breed true”
from parent to offspring.
An interesting finding from genetic research, which Mack-
intosh mentions, only in passing, as posing a problem in the
estimation of the heritability of g, is that there is greater
assortative mating for g than for any other behavioral trait;
that is, spouse correlations are only ∼.1 for personality and
only ∼.2 for height or weight, but the correlation for as-
sortative mating for g is ∼.4. In addition to indicating that
people are able to make judgments about g in real life, this
finding suggests that assortative mating may contribute to
the substantial additive genetic variance for g, because pos-
itive assortative mating for a character can increase its ad-
ditive genetic variance.
One of the most surprising genetic findings about g during
the past decade is not mentioned by Mackintosh, even though
this finding has major implications for his attempt to under-
stand the cognitive processes that underlie g. Work on genetic
influences on intelligence has, to date, focused on g; we know
much less about the genetic and environmental origins of in-
dividual differences in such specific cognitive abilities as spatial
ability, verbal ability, memory, and processing speed. Specific
cognitive abilities show substantial genetic influence, although
it is less than that for g (Plomin and DeFries 1998). To what
extent do different sets of genes affect these phenotypically
different abilities? A technique called “multivariate genetic
analysis” examines covariance among specific cognitive abil-
ities and yields a statistic called “the genetic correlation,”
which is the extent to which genetic effects on one trait cor-
relate with genetic effects on another trait, independent of the
heritability of the two traits. In other words, although cognitive
abilities are moderately heritable, the genetic correlations be-
tween them could be anywhere from .0, indicating complete
independence, to 1.0, indicating that the same genes influence
a variety of cognitive abilities. Multivariate analyses have
shown that there is substantial genetic influence on each of
these individual abilities, although it is less than that for g
(Plomin and DeFries 1998). More surprisingly, such analyses
have consistently found that genetic correlations among spe-
cific cognitive abilities are very high—close to 1.0 (Petrill et
al. 1997).
These genetic results have major implications for current
theories of cognitive neuroscience. According to one theory,
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the brain works in a modular fashion—that is, cognitive pro-
cesses are specific and independent. Implicit in this perspective
is a bottom-up reductionist view of genetics, in which indi-
vidual modules are the targets of gene action. The findings
from multivariate genetic analyses suggest a top-down view,
in which genetic effects operate primarily on g, rather than
suggest a bottom-up view, in which genetic effects are specific
to modules. Given that the brain has evolved to learn from a
variety of experiences and to solve a variety of problems, per-
haps it makes sense that it would function holistically. How-
ever, finding genetic correlations near 1.0 does not prove that
genetic effects are limited to a single general cognitive process
that works in a top-down way. Another alternative is that
specific cognitive abilities, as they are currently assessed, might
tap many of the same modular processes that are each affected
by different sets of genes. This alternative hypothesis could be
tested by means of multivariate genetic research on measures
of modular processes, such as neuroimaging measures of brain
function (Watkins et al. 1999 [in this issue]; Kosslyn and
Plomin, in press).
Another direction for genetic research, one that is too new
to be mentioned in Mackintosh’s book, is the attempt to iden-
tify specific genes responsible for the heritability of g. DNA
associations with g have begun to be reported (Chorney et al.
1998), including initial results from a systematic genome scan
for association, by means of DNA pooling (Fisher et al. 1999).
Neuroscience research with knockout animal models of learn-
ing and memory is likely to accelerate research on the molec-
ular genetics of g, especially as neuroscientists come to appre-
ciate the broad relevance of g. Finding specific genes associated
with g will facilitate more-precise answers to questions such
as modularity. For example, to what extent are genes that are
associated with modular processes, such as long-term poten-
tiation, also associated with g? Finding genes for g will have
implications for society as well as for science (Plomin, in press).
If, as I predict, g will soon take center stage in genetic research
on the neuroscience of learning and memory, Mackintosh’s
excellent overview of research on g will be of great help to
geneticists and others with an interest in the workings of learn-
ing, memory, and intelligence.
ROBERT PLOMIN





Bouchard TJ Jr, McGue M (1981) Familial studies of intelligence: a
review. Science 212:1055–1059
Brody N (1992) Intelligence, 2d ed. Academic Press, New York
Chorney MJ, Chorney K, Seese N, Owen MJ, Daniels J, McGuffin P,
Thompson LA, et al (1998) A quantitative trait locus (QTL) asso-
ciated with cognitive ability in children. Psychol Sci 9:159–166
Fisher PJ, Turic D, Williams NM, McGuffin P, Asherson P, Ball D,
Craig I, et al (1999) DNA pooling identifies QTLs on chromosome
4 for general cognitive ability in children. Hum Mol Genet 8:915–
922
Herrnstein RJ, Murray C (1994) The bell curve: intelligence and class
structure in American life. Free Press, New York
Jensen AR (1998) The g factor: the science of mental ability. Westport,
CT, Praeger
Kosslyn S, Plomin R. Towards a neuro-cognitive genetics: goals and
issues. In: Dougherty D, Rauch SL, Rosenbaum JF (eds) Psychiatric
neuroimaging strategies: research and clinical applications. Ameri-
can Psychiatric Press,Washington, DC (in press)
McClearn GE, Johansson B, Berg S, Pedersen NL, Ahern F, Petrill SA,
Plomin R (1997) Substantial genetic influence on cognitive abilities
in twins 80 years old. Science 276:1560–1563
McGue M, Bouchard TJ, Iacono WG, Lykken DT (1993) Behavioral
genetics of cognitive ability: a life-span perspective. In: Plomin R,
McClearn GE (eds) Nature, nurture, and psychology. American Psy-
chological Association, Washington, DC, pp 59–76
Mervis CB, Robinson BF, Pani JR (1999) Visuospatial construction.
Am J Hum Genet 65:000–000 (in this issue)
Migaud M, Charlesworth P, Dempster M, Webster LC, Watabe AM,
Makhinson M, He Y, et al (1998) Enhanced long-term potentiation
and impaired learning in mice with mutant postsynaptic density-95
protein. Nature 396:433–439
Petrill SA, Saudino KJ, Cherny SS, Emde RN, Hewitt JK, Fulker DW,
Plomin R (1997) Exploring the genetic etiology of low general cog-
nitive ability from 14 to 36 months. Dev Psychol 33:544–548
Plomin R. Genetics and general cognitive ability. Nature (in press)
Plomin R, DeFries JC (1998) Genetics of cognitive abilities and dis-
abilities. Sci Am (May), pp 62–69
Seligman D (1992) A question of intelligence: the IQ debate in Amer-
ica. Carol Publishing, New York
Sternberg RJ, Grigorenko EL (1997) Intelligence: heredity and envi-
ronment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Watkins KE, Gadian DG, Vargha-Khadem F (1999) Functional and
structural brain abnormalities associated with a genetic disorder of
speech and language. Am J Hum Genet 65:000–000 (in this issue)
 1999 by The American Society of Human Genetics. All rights reserved.
0002-9297/1999/6505-0000$02.00
Am. J. Hum. Genet. 65:1477–1478, 1999
A Means to an End: The Biological Basis of Aging and
Death. By William C. Clark. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999. Pp. 234. $27.50 (cloth).
The questions of how and why we age have great intrinsic
intellectual appeal and major societal implications. William
Clark, an Emeritus Professor of Immunology at UCLA, has
written a popular book in an attempt to introduce the subject
to nonspecialists. That he himself is a nonspecialist is probably
a good thing, since there is the potential to bring a fresh new
perspective. He has succeeded in producing a very readable
review that does indeed outline the major ideas. Unfortunately,
although he quite properly emphasizes the evolutionary theory
of why we age, his language in many sections of the book
indicates a belief that a genetic program has evolved to produce
senescence.
All serious students of the evolutionary biology of aging
would agree that the senescent phenotypes that emerge in age-
structured populations are the result of a decline in the force
of natural selection with respect to the age of gene effects (Rose
1991). Two classes of gene action are envisaged. The first class,
originally outlined by Haldane and Medawar (1952), includes
